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Abstract—Deep neural networks have proven to be quite
effective in a wide variety of machine learning tasks, ranging
from improved speech recognition systems to advancing the
development of autonomous vehicles. However, despite their
superior performance in many applications, these models have
been recently shown to be susceptible to a particular type of
attack possible through the generation of particular synthetic
examples referred to as adversarial samples. These samples are
constructed by manipulating real examples from the training
data distribution in order to “fool” the original neural model,
resulting in misclassification (with high confidence) of previously
correctly classified samples. Addressing this weakness is of utmost
importance if deep neural architectures are to be applied to
critical applications, such as those in the domain of cybersecurity.
In this paper, we present an analysis of this fundamental
flaw lurking in all neural architectures to uncover limitations
of previously proposed defense mechanisms. More importantly,
we present a unifying framework for protecting deep neural
models using a non-invertible data transformation–developing
two adversary-resilient architectures utilizing both linear and
nonlinear dimensionality reduction. Empirical results indicate
that our framework provides better robustness compared to state-
of-art solutions while having negligible degradation in accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aside from its highly publicized victories in Go [33], there
have been numerous successful applications of deep neural
network (DNN) learning in image and speech recognition.
Recent interest has been to integrate it into critical fields like
medical imaging [1], [37] and self-driving cars [13], [8]. In
cybersecurity, security companies have demonstrated that deep
learning could offer a far better way to detect all types of
malware [27], [4], [38] and recognize such functions in binary
code [32].
However, recent work[35], [22] uncovered a potential flaw
in DNN-powered systems that could be readily exploited by
an attack. They show that an attacker could use the same
learning algorithm, back-propagation, and a surrogate data set
to construct an auxiliary model that can accurately approxi-
mate the target DNN model. When compared to the original
model that usually returns categorical classification results
(e.g., benign or malicious binary code), such an auxiliary
model could provide the attacker with useful details about
a DNN’s weaknesses (e.g., a continuous classification score
for a malware sample). As such, the attacker can use the
auxiliary model to perform invertible computation, or examine
class/feature importance to identify the features that have
significant impact on the target’s classification ability. With this
knowledge of feature importance, the attacker can minimize
effort in crafting an adversarial sample – a synthetic example
generated by modifying a real example slightly in order to
make the original DNN model believe it belongs to the wrong
class with high confidence. For example, Fig. 1 illustrates the
case where an adversarial sample constructed by modifying
a picture of a panda misleads the original DNN model into
believing it is a gibbon.
To mitigate the aforementioned kind of attack, solu-
tions [11], [15], [20] proposed generally follow the basic
idea of adversarial training in which a DNN is trained with
both samples from the original data distribution as well as
artificially synthesized adversarial ones. A recent unification
of previous approaches [24] showed that they were all special
cases of a general, regularized objective function,DataGrad.
While such a framework vastly improves the DNN’s robustness
to adversarial samples, the final model is still not completely
resilient given that the adversarial sample space is unbounded.
Hence, a newly trained DNN would only be robust with
respect to previously observed adversarial samples (or for those
relatively near to training samples of the underlying manifold
if one uses the general approximation to DataGrad developed
in [24]).
Here, we present a new defense framework that increases
the difficulty for attackers by crafting adversarial samples,
i.e. making DNN models resilient to any adversarial sample
whether or not they have been previously observed by DNN
models. The basic idea underlying our new framework is
to transform the input data into a new representation before
presenting it to a DNN model. More specifically, the trans-
formation employs a non-invertible dimensionality reduction
approach that projects an input sample into a low dimension
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Figure 1. Demonstration of an adversarial example generated from a panda picture [10]. The left picture represents the original image classified as a panda
with 60% confidence. Right picture is an adversarial sample obtained by adding a tiny perturbation to the original picture. Despite being visually similar to the
original image, the adversarial sample is classified as a gibbon with 99% confidence.
representation. As mentioned earlier, an attacker needs to
perform an invertible computation to examine the feature/class
importance through an auxiliary DNN model. With this trans-
formation, the complexity of such an invertible computation
is significantly increased and the attacker is no longer able to
perform feature/class examination.
Technically speaking, our framework is similar to a distil-
lation process, which trains a DNN model using the knowl-
edge transferred from a different model [26]. However, it is
fundamentally different from the distillation approach. In fact,
the distillation approach does not improve the robustness of
a DNN because it does not increase the complexity of the
invertible computation. As we will demonstrate in Section III,
an attacker can easily construct an auxiliary model and craft
adversarial samples even when the DNN model is trained
through a distillation procedure.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions.
• We conduct a detailed analysis on various existing
defense mechanisms against adversarial samples, and
demonstrate their limitations.
• We present a comprehensive framework that makes a
DNN model resilient to adversarial samples by inte-
grating an input transformation into the DNN model.
• We develop two new defense mechanisms by inject-
ing different dimensional reduction methods into the
proposed framework.
• We theoretically and empirically evaluate the DNN
models, showing that our new defense framework is
resilient to adversarial samples.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the background of DNNs. Section III discusses
the limitations of existing defense mechanisms. Section IV
presents a unifying framework and Section V develops two
defense mechanisms using dimensionality reduction methods,
both linear and nonlinear. In Section VI, we evaluate our
proposed framework. Section VII discusses some related work
followed by the conclusion in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
We briefly introduce the well-established deep neural net-
work (DNN) model and then describe how to generate adver-
Figure 2. Standard neural network [34] with two hidden layers, where neurons
are fully connected. This architecture is often referred to as a feed-forward
neural network [2]
sarial samples from it in order to exploit its inherent flaws.
Finally, we discuss our threat model.
A. Deep Neural Networks
A typical DNN architecture consists of multiple successive
layers of processing elements, or so-called “neurons”. Each
processing layer can be viewed as learning a different, more
abstract representation of the original multidimensional input
distribution. As a whole, a DNN can be viewed as a highly
complex function that is capable of mapping original high-
dimensional data points to a lower dimensional space in any
nonlinear fashion. As shown in Fig 2, a typical DNN contains
an input layer, multiple hidden layers, and an output layer. The
input layer takes in each data sample in the form of a multidi-
mensional vector. Starting from the input, computing the acti-
vations of each subsequent layer simply requires, at minimum,
a matrix multiplication (where a weight/parameter vector, with
length equal to the number of hidden units in the target layer,
is assigned to each unit of the layer below) followed by
summation with a bias vector. This process roughly models
the process of a layer of neurons integrating the information
received from the layer below (i.e., computing a pre-activation)
before applying an elementwise activation function1. This
integrate-then-fire process is repeatedly subsequently for each
layer until the last layer is reached. The last layer, or output, is
generally interpreted as the model’s predictions for some given
input data, and is often designed compute a parameterized
1There are many types of activations to choose from, including the hyper-
bolic tangent, the logistic sigmoid, or the linear rectified function, etc [2]
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posterior distribution using the softmax function (also known
as multi-class regression or maximum entropy). This bottom-
up propagation of information is also referred to as feed-
forward inference [14].
During the learning phase of the model, the DNN’s pre-
dictions are evaluated by comparing them with known target
labels associated with the training samples. Specifically, both
predictions and labels are taken as the input to a selected cost
function, such as cross-entropy. The DNN’s parameters are
then optimized with respect to the cost function using the
method of steepest gradient descent, minimizing prediction
errors on the training set. Parameter gradients are calculated
using back-propagation of errors [31]. Since the gradients of
the weights represent their influence on the final cost, there
have been multiple algorithms developed for finding optimal
weights more accurately and efficiently [21].
B. The Adversarial Sample Problem
Even though a well trained model is capable of recognizing
out-of-sample patterns, a deep neural architecture can be easily
fooled by introducing perturbations to the input variables that
are often indistinguishable to the human eye [35]. These so-
called “blind spots”, or adversarial samples, exist because
the input space of DNN is unbounded [10]. Based on this
fundamental flaw, we can uncover specific data samples in the
input space able to bypass DNN models. More specifically, it
was studied in [10] that attackers can find the most powerful
blind spots via effective optimization procedures. In multi-class
classification tasks, such adversarial samples can cause a DNN
model to classify a data point into a random class besides the
correct one (sometimes not even a reasonable alternative).
Furthermore, according to [35], DNN models that share the
same design goal, for example recognizing the same image set,
all approximate a common highly complex, nonlinear function.
Therefore, a relatively large fraction of adversarial examples
generated from one trained DNN will be misclassified by the
other DNN models trained from the same data set but with
different hyper-parameters. Therefore, given a target DNN,
we refer to adversarial samples that are generated from other
different DNN models but still maintain their attack efficacy
against the target as cross-model adversarial samples.
Adversarial samples are generated by computing the
derivative of the cost function with respect to the network’s
input variables. The gradient of any input sample represents
a direction vector in the high dimensional input space. Along
this direction, an small change of this input sample will cause
a DNN to generate a completely different prediction result.
This particular direction is important since it represents the
most effective way of compromising the optimization of the
cost function. Discovering this particular direction is realized
by passing the layer gradients from output layer to input
layer via back-propagation. The gradient at the input may
then be applied to the input sample(s) to craft an adversarial
example(s).
To be more specific, let us define a cost function
L(θ,X, Y ), where θ, X and Y denotes the weights of the
DNN, the input data set, and the corresponding labels respec-
tively. In general, adversarial samples can be crafted by adding
to legitimate ones via an adversarial perturbation δx. In [10],
the efficient and straightforward fast gradient sign method was
proposed for calculating adversarial perturbation as shown in
in (1):
δx = φsign(JL(θ, x, y)), (1)
here δx is calculated by multiplying the sign of the gradients
of legitimate samples with some coefficient φ. JL denotes the
gradients of the loss function L(·) with respect to the data x.
y is the corresponding label of x. φ controls the scale of the
gradients to be added.
Adversarial perturbation indicates the actual direction vec-
tor to be added to legitimate samples. This vector drives a
legitimate sample x towards a direction that the cost function
L(·) is significantly sensitive to. However, it should be noted
that δx must be maintained within a small scale. Otherwise
adding δx will cause a significant distortion to a legitimate
sample, leaving the manipulation to be easily detected. In the
next section, we will develop two threat models that utilize the
properties of adversarial samples.
C. Threat Model
The threat models introduced in this part all follow the
line of exploiting the sensitivity of DNN models with respect
to input samples. We first introduce an attack which utilizes
direct knowledge of the target DNN model. This attack is only
valid under the assumption that all detailed DNN information,
regarding both architecture and exact parameters, is disclosed
to an adversary. Since this assumption might be too strong to
be practical in real world scenarios, we further present another
threat model that is also effective for fooling a normal DNN
but not restricted by the aforementioned assumption.
1) White Box Threat Model: As previously introduced, an
adversary can manipulate data samples to mislead a normal
DNN by using gradients with respect to a loss function. In
order to obtain the gradient of a data sample, the adversary
needs to have access to the exact form of the cost function, the
architecture of the DNN mode, as well as the tuned coefficients
found as a result of the model’s training procedure. Assuming
that all of this information is available, an adversary can tweak
any testing data sample towards a direction using its gradient
information.
To be more specific, the gradient of a test sample indicates
the direction along which even small changes of this test
sample will yield a significant difference in the cost function.
Once the gradients are calculated, one may use the procedure
detailed in Section II-B to manipulate samples to trick the
DNN into generating worst case prediction results. However, in
the real world, detailed DNN information can be well protected
using various data integrity techniques making the White Box
assumption too strong. Therefore, we introduce another threat
model not restricted by this assumption and is yet effective in
attacking a normal neural architecture.
2) Black Box Threat Model: Since DNNs have become
a well established machine learning method, the training
procedures and typical cost functions used are common public
knowledge. Furthermore, recall that a DNN is designed to
approximate a highly nonlinear function that is capable of
mapping original data samples into a space that makes pre-
diction simpler. If we assume that a given training data and
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application scenario, then it follows that different DNN models
are all tuned to behave similarly to one other. Therefore,
an attacker could utilize a well-known learning algorithm,
a typical architecture, and a similar data set to build an
auxiliary model that accurately approximates the target model.
Since the auxiliary model is in the adversary’s full possession,
he can easily generate cross-model adversarial samples as
previously introduced. Therefore, a successful attack (using
cross-model adversarial samples) can be conducted even most
of the information about a target DNN is unavailable.
Based on these two threat models, our proposed DNN
architecture is designed to be robust in both scenarios. Particu-
larly, we provide both a theoretical proof and empirical demon-
stration of the robustness of our proposed DNN architecture
even under the white box threat. In the following section,
we will provide a thorough analysis of existing solutions for
defending against adversarial samples. We will then show that
the fundamental flaw introduced in this section is not fully and
properly addressed by these solutions.
III. MOTIVATION
We start this section with an overview of recent solutions
developed for defending against adversarial samples. These
solutions fall into two categories: 1) augmenting the training
set and 2) enhancing model complexity. The former is mainly
represented by adversarial training while the latter mainly
combines various data transformations with a standard DNN.
A. Data Augmentation
For image recognition, current publicly available image sets
can be easily used as a starting point. Adversarial samples
shown in Fig. 1 are blind spots specifically created to trick
a DNN into misclassifying with high confidence. To resolve
the blind spot issue, there have been many data augmentation
methods proposed for deep learning tasks [10], [24]. In prin-
ciple, these methods expand their training set by combining
known samples with potential blind spots. The same mecha-
nism has also been employed for defending against adversarial
samples, also known as adversarial training [24]. Here, we
analyze the limitations of data augmentation mechanisms and
argue that these limitations also apply to adversarial training
methods.
Given the high dimensionality of data distributions that
DNNs typically learn from, the input space is generally
considered infinite [10]. This implies that there could also
exist an infinite amount of blind spots, which are adversarial
samples specific to DNN models. Therefore, data augmentation
based approaches have the challenge of covering these very
large spaces. Since adversarial training is a form of data
augmentation, this approach is inherently limited in its ability
to protect a DNN from blind spots.
Adversarial training can be formally described as adding a
regularization term known as DataGrad to a DNN’s training
cost function [24]. The regularization penalizes the directions
uncovered by adversarial perturbations (introduced in Section
II). Therefore, adversarial training works to improve the worst
case performance of DNN. Treating the DNN much like
a generative model, adversarial samples are produced via
back-propagation and mixed into the training set and directly
integrated into the model’s learning phase.
Despite the fact that there exists infinite adversarial sam-
ples, adversarial training is effective for defending against
those which are powerful and easily crafted. This is due to
the fact that, in most adversarial training approaches [24],
[10], adversarial samples can be generated efficiently for a
particular type of DNN. The fast gradient sign method [10]
can generate a large pool of adversarial samples quickly while
DataGrad [24] focuses on dynamically generating them per
every parameter update. However, the simplicity and efficiency
of generating adversarial samples also makes adversarial train-
ing vulnerable when these two properties are exploited in order
to attack the adversarial training itself. Given that there exist
infinite adversarial samples, we would need to repeat an adver-
sarial training procedure each time a new adversarial example
is found. DataGrad, as mentioned [24], could be viewed as
taking advantage of adversarial perturbations to better explore
the underlying data manifold–however, while this leads to
improved generalization, it does not offer any guarantees in
covering all possible blind-spots. More importantly, adversarial
training does nothing to change the actual reversible nature of
a DNN’s architecture itself, which we argue is the more direct
and ultimately more effective way in building a strong defense.
B. Enhancing Model Complexity
DNN models are already complex, with respect to both
the nonlinear function they try to approximate as well as their
layered composition of many parameters. The architecture is
straightforward in order to facilitate the flow of information
forwards and backward, which greatly alleviates the effort in
generating adversarial samples. Therefore, several ideas [26],
[11] have been proposed to enhance the complexity of DNN
architecture, aiming to improve the tolerance of complex DNN
models with respect to adversarial samples generated from
simple DNN models.
[26] develops a defensive distillation mechanism, which
trains a DNN from data samples that are distilled by another
DNN. By using the knowledge transferred from the other
DNN, the learned DNN classifiers become less sensitive to
adversarial samples. However, although shown to be effective,
this method still relies on gradient flow from output to input.
This is because both DNN models used in this architecture
can be approximated by an adversary via training two other
DNN models that share the same functionality and have similar
performance. Once the two approximating DNN models are
obtained, the adversary can generate adversarial samples spe-
cific to this distillation-enhanced DNN model. [11] proposed
stacking an auto-encoder together with a normal DNN, similar
to [26]. It was first shown that this auto-encoding enhancement
increases DNN resilience to adversarial samples. However,
the authors further demonstrate that this stacked model can
be simply taken as a new DNN and easily generate new
adversarial samples.
Though the above approaches, both from data-
augmentation and model complexity perspectives, have
proven effective in handling samples generated from normal
adversarial DNN models, they do not handle all adversarial
samples. In light of this, we propose a framework that blocks
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the gradient flow from the output to input variables, a solution
that prove effective even when the architecture and parameters
of a given a DNN are publicly disclosed.
IV. DATA TRANSFORMATION ENHANCED DNN
FRAMEWORK
In this section, we shall fully specify our framework’s de-
sign goals and choose a particular type of data transformation
that will fulfill these goals.
A. Design Goals
Recall that many previously proposed solutions, especially
adversarial training methods [10], [24], can be classified
as forms of data augmentation. By their very nature, these
approaches cannot possibly hope to cover the entire data
space, unless perhaps they had access to all important rep-
resentative points of the underlying manifold (which is highly
unlikely in practice). This implies that attackers can always
find adversarial samples targeted to any particular DNN model.
More importantly, developing adversarial training methods has
required the invention of efficient methods for generating
adversarial samples [10], [35], consequently providing more
useful tools for attackers.
This further facilitates new attacks specifically designed for
DNN models learned using adversarial training algorithms.
We argue that a robust DNN architecture has the property
that adversarial samples cannot be generated from itself. This
we consider to mean that the flow of error gradients from the
output to input variables must be obstructed (while minimally
affecting model generalization performance). Since most DNN
models are simple and straightforward, their architectures are
usually well known and hence easy to approximate. Therefore,
a robust DNN satisfying our desired property can still be secure
even under the most extreme circumstances, such as when all
of its detailed parameters are disclosed to adversaries. Our
framework specifically must satisfy two goals:
• It has minimal impact on the performance of a DNN
model when legitimate samples are seen.
• It is resilient to cross-model adversarial samples as
introduced in Section II.
• It ‘blocks gradient flow from reaching the input.
B. Framework Overview
Adversarial samples are generated via backpropagation
during training, as described in Section II. This implies that
by following the path of gradient flow, adversarial samples
can be generated quite conveniently. In order to prevent this,
we propose blocking this gradient path by combining the
DNN architecture with particular data transformation methods.
Specifically, we insert a data transformation module before
the input layer of the DNN, in effect preforming a special
preprocessing of input samples. As a result, the procedure
for generating adversarial samples will only work for the
transformed data, if the right kind input transformation is cho-
sen such that information cannot reach the original observed
variables directly from objective function. Furthermore, even
when an adversary successfully generates adversarial samples
based on the transformed data, we can guarantee that this
adversary will be unable to map the adversarial data samples
to the original input space if the data transformation employed
is non-invertible. More formally, we define a data transforma-
tion method as non-invertible when it satisfies either of the
following properties: (1) inverting the data transformation is
computationally too complex to be tractable; or (2) inverting
the data transformation will cause significant reconstruction
error.
Our proposed framework, graphically depicted in Fig 3,
has several properties that guarantee that a DNN is well pro-
tected against adversarial samples while suffering at most only
trivial changes in performance. First, any non-invertible data
transformation method can ensure that the gradient flow in the
framework is effectively blocked. This critically ensures that an
adversary cannot generate samples using our framework using
a method like the fast gradient sign method (see Section II).
Second, the framework is capable of legitimately handling test
samples since the DNN model is trained on top of a data
transformation that preserves crucial information contained in
the original input distribution. Third, any non-invertible data
transformation method may be used in tandem with a normal
DNN model under our unified framework.
However, it is important to note that integrating a DNN
with a data transformation may be computationally expensive,
which might make this defense less attractive given that
standard DNN training is already computationally intensive.
We resolve this issue by exploring data transforms that are
computationally efficient and more importantly, incremental.
The latter requirement is essential given that any data trans-
formation method must be capable of handling unseen samples
as they are presented. Otherwise, the data transformation will
need to be retrained, and subsequently, the DNN on top of the
newly retrained transform layer.
Dimensionality reduction is one particular data transfor-
mation mechanism that satisfies these design objectives. First,
dimensionality reduction methods are often designed to pre-
serve at least the most important aspects of the original data.
Second, dimensionality reduction can serve as a filter for ad-
versarial perturbations when a DNN is confronted with cross-
model adversarial samples. Third, dimensionality reduction
helps reduce the dimensionality of the input distribution that
is fed into the DNN. Finally, it is easier to develop non-
invertible data transformation methods, since recovering higher
dimensional data from lower dimensional data is difficult.
The following sections introduce details of two developed
defence mechanisms using different non-invertible dimensional
reduction methods.
V. DATA TRANSFORMATION ENHANCED DNNS
We present two variations of an adversary resilient DNN
architecture that satisfies the two key design goals of our
proposed defense framework (Section IV). In particular, one
variant utilizes a linear method while the other makes use
of a non-linear approach. With respect to the linear method,
we show that, theoretically, there is a lower bound on the
reconstruction error. More importantly, we design our linear
method to have a reconstruction error that is significantly
larger than this lower bound which in turn satisfies the char-
acteristics we defined for a non-invertible data transformation.
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Figure 3. A data transformation enhanced DNN. In the feed-forward pass, input data is first projected to a particular space and the transformed data is then
used to train a standard DNN classifier. However, the gradient flow is blocked by the data transformation.
With respect to the second approach, we employ a nonlinear
dimension reduction approach that we prove satisfies the
second characteristic of a non-invertible data transformation.
Critically, we show that, in order to recover the original data
from from this low dimensional representation, an inversion of
the corresponding dimensional reduction method is required,
which can be converted to a quadratic problem with a non-
positive, semi-definite constraint. This belongs to a class of
NP-hard problems, according to [5].
A. Designed Linear Mapping (DLM) DNN
We first propose a novel linear dimensional reduction
method, which stems from principal component analysis
(PCA). Then, a straightforward strategy is introduced for
reconstructing the original high dimensional data by inverting
our proposed transformation. In addition, we provide a theorem
that places the lower bound on the reconstruction error. The
inversion strategy will be further used in Section VI to demon-
strate that our proposed method satisfies the requirements of
non-invertibility.
PCA is one of the most widely adopted dimensional reduc-
tion methods, especially since it is computationally efficient
and easy to implement [16]. These are useful properties when
considering PCA as a possible transform to combine with
a DNN, since the DNN itself is already computationally
expensive. Additionally, PCA preserves critical information by
finding a low-dimensional subspace with maximal variance.
However, PCA can be easily inverted to reconstruct original
data samples given their lower dimensional mappings. More-
over, the reconstructed data usually exhibits insignificant dis-
tortion when compared to the original data (see Figure 7 (a)).
This implies that, if an attacker generates adversarial samples
from a DNN trained on low dimensional mappings, it would
be simple to generate high dimension adversarial samples
by mapping this low dimensional data back to the original
dimension. We will show in Section VI the effectiveness of
inverting PCA by examining several reconstructed images from
the MNIST data set.
PCA preserves meaningful features of the original data
when mapping them to a lower dimension. Given a data matrix
X ∈ Rn×p, the transformation matrix W can be obtained by
solving the following optimization function:
arg min
Y,W
1
2
∣∣∣∣X − YWT ∣∣∣∣
F
(2)
where W ∈ Rp×q , WTW = Iq and Y ∈ Rn×q . According to
the Eckart-Young Theorem [7], the optimal solution is obtained
when W consists of the q largest eigenvalues of XTX .
Therefore, the low dimensional mappings can be computed
as follows:
Y = XW (3)
Accordingly, we can approximately reconstruct the high di-
mensional X from the transformed data Y according via:
Xˆ = YWT (4)
which represents the process of reconstructing high dimen-
sional approximation using only low dimensional mappings
and a transform matrix. Note that this process has low compu-
tational cost–we only need to calculate the inverse transforma-
tion of Y . In Section VI, we show that the reconstructed data
is quite similar to original data. Therefore, using PCA alone
for a data transformation does not satisfy the non-invertible
criteria we introduced in Section IV, and thus insufficient for
crafting an adversary-resilient DNN.
To deal with this problem and yet preserve computational
efficiency, we equip PCA with our first non-invertible charac-
teristic. To do this, we propose a novel dimension reduction
method we call a designed linear mapping (DLM). DLM is
designed to combine the lower dimensional mapping generated
by PCA with other lower dimensional mappings generated
by multiplying the original data with a column-wise, highly
correlated transformation matrix. This design ensures that the
PCA operation continues to preserve the critical information
while the column-wise highly correlated transformation matrix
guarantees that inverting the DLM will generate significant
6
reconstruction error. To explain the consequence of this, we
now introduce DLM in detail and examine its properties.
Much as in (3), we shall formally define DLM to be:
Y = XCT + ω, (5)
where X ∈ Rn×p the same as introduced earlier, except
that Y ∈ Rn×pc . ω ∈ Rn×pc denotes a normally distributed
noise matrix, where each entry of ω generated from a normal
distribution N(0, σ2). C ∈ Rpc×p is the transformation matrix
obtained by following equation:
C = [B;A], (6)
where C is constructed by combining a loading matrix
B ∈ Rpb×p obtained via PCA with a designed matrix A ∈
R(pc−pb)×p, of which all columns are highly correlated. This
combination integrates PCA’s information-preserving effects
into our DLM. As such, the lower dimensional projection Y
can provide a better representation of the original X .
Since the DLM described by (5) has a simple linear form,
we estimate reconstruction Xˆ for X using high-dimensional
linear regression [28] (we omit calculation details due to space
constraints). According to Theorem 1 in [28], under certain
assumption, we can obtain a lower bound of the reconstruction
error, which is the L2 norm of the difference between X and
Xˆ as shown in (7):(
L2(X, Xˆ)
)2
≥ κ0 σ2 s log(p/s)
pc
, (7)
where s denotes the sparsity of X . κ0 is a constant whose value
depends closely on the data set. Therefore, given a certain set
of data, any linear transformation method is restricted by a
constant lower bound calculated according to (7). In addition,
according to Theorem 2 in [28], there also exists an upper
bound of the reconstruction error as follows:(
L2(X, Xˆ)
)2
≤ f(C)s log(p)
pc
, (8)
where f(C) is a function of C. According to [28], the
upper bound of the reconstruction error depends on both the
data transformation matrix C and noise ω. When C is a an
independent correlation matrix, as in PCA, then the upper
bound will approach the aforementioned lower bound hence
restricting the reconstruction error within a narrow range close
to the lower bound. However, since we specifically design C
to be highly correlated, the upper bound will be significantly
larger than the lower bound [9], [6], and thus result in a larger
range for the reconstruction error.
B. Dimensionality Reduction by Learning an Invariant Map-
ping (DrLIM) DNN
As introduced in Section II, adversarial samples are gener-
ated by changing legitimate samples with small perturbations.
But when processed by normal DNN models, the decisions
made in a lower dimensional space are completely different
from those made for legitimate samples, even though adversar-
ial samples are highly similar to legitimate ones. Note that this
characteristic also occurs in cross-model adversarial samples.
Therefore, we intend to employ a dimensionality reduction
method that preserves the similarity of high dimensional
samples in their lower dimensional mappings. Furthermore, our
method needs to be capable of extracting critical information
contained in the original data. Since the training of a DNN is
already computationally intensive, our approach needs to be
incremental in order to avoid the need for retraining the DNN.
Because of these considerations, we employ the dimen-
sionality reduction method DrLIM proposed in [12]. DrLIM
is specifically designed for preserving similarity between pairs
of high dimensional samples when they are mapped to a lower
dimensional space. The method restricts the lower dimensional
mapping of cross-model adversarial samples to a vicinity
where it is filled by mappings of legitimate samples that are
highly similar to these cross-model adversarial samples. As a
result, there is a significantly lower chance that an adversarial
sample acts as an outlier in the lower dimensional space, since
its mapped location is bounded by the mapped locations of
similar, legitimate samples. DrLIM can also be used in an
online setting.
More importantly, we theoretically prove that inverting
DrLIM is an NP-hard problem. Therefore, DrLIM is suitable
for our framework in that it satisfies the second characteristic
of non-invertiblity defined in Section IV. But first, we briefly
review DrLIM (for a detailed explication please see [12]).
DrLIM consists of a convolutional neural network (CNN)
model designed for optimizing the cost function:
P∑
i=1
L
(
W, (Y,Xi1 , Xi2)
i
)
, (9)
where W denotes the coefficients. Xi1 and Xi2 denote the ith
pair of input sample vectors with i = 1 . . . P . Y is a binary
label assigned to each pair of samples, with Y = 0 denoting
a similar pair of Xi1 and Xi2 , and Y = 1 for dissimilar pairs.
Note that the similarity of each pair is not limited to any
particular distance-based measure. This means that any prior
knowledge can be utilized in representing similarity, including
manually assigned similarity and dissimilarity. Thus, the clas-
sical approach for measuring a Euclidean distance between
samples for representing dissimilarity can be enhanced with
prior knowledge. Let the loss function for measuring the cost
for each pair of samples be defined as:
L (W,Y,X1, X2) =(1− Y )1
2
(
D(X1, X2)
)2
+
Y
2
{max(0,m−D(X1, X2))}2, (10)
where D(X1, X2) = ‖G(X1)−G(X2)‖2 is the Euclidean dis-
tance measured between the output lower dimension mapping
G(X1) and G(X1) for the sample pair X1 and X2. Let m be a
predefined constant which indicates whether all dissimilar pairs
are pushed or pulled towards to maintain a constant distance
m (i omitted for simplicity).
Since G represents a mapping by the CNN to enable the
recovery of high dimensional data from the low dimensional
data G(X), we need to first get G−1(X). For the forward
pass of a conventional neural network, it is not guaranteed
that the weight matrices are invertible [39], implying that
information lost during pooling cannot be recovered. Thus, it
is very difficult to compute G−1(X) and recover the original
data from a low dimensional representation. Since inverting
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the CNN is nearly impossible, one option is to reconstruct
original X according to (10) given W and Y . In the following,
we demonstrate that even this approach can be mapped to a
NP-hard problem.
As discussed before, the most important property of DrLIM
that allows it to fit into our framework is that it is provably
non-invertible. Assuming G(X) takes a simple linear form
of G(X) = WX , then we have D(X1, X2)2 = (X1 −
X2)
TWTW (X1 − X2). Here we denote δX = (X1 − X2).
Following this assumption, we can reformulate (10) as follows:
min
δX,z
∑
(1− Y )δXTWTWδX + Y z2,
s.t. z ≥ 0,
z ≥ m−
√
δXTWTWδX,
(11)
where z = max
(
0,m − D(X1, X2)
)
. Here we reformulate
the second constraint as
√
δXTWTWδX ≥ m − z. Since
m− z ≥ 0, we have following:
δXTWTWδX ≥ (m− z)2. (12)
Therefore, W is positive semi-definite. When both sides of (12)
are multiplied by −1 and substituted into (11), we find that:
min
δX,z
∑
(1− Y )δXTWTWδX + Y z2,
s.t. z ≥ 0,
− δXTWTWδX ≤ −(m− z)2.
(13)
From earlier work [36], the formulation (13) implies a
quadratic problem with a non-positive semi-definite constraint,
which is an NP-hard problem.
Note that solving (13) can yields the distance δX . There are
multiple pairs of X1 and X2 that satisfy that δX = (X1−X2).
This makes the problem even harder to solve. Additionally,
since the linear relaxation (13) is already NP-hard, the original
problem (10) is also NP-hard given that G(X) is commonly
regarded as a nonlinear function approximated by a neural
network.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Experiments Settings
We evaluate our framework by performing experiments on
the the widely-used MNIST data set [18]. MNIST contains
a training split with 600000 greyscale images of handwritten
digits and a test set containing 10000 images. Each image has
a dimensionality of 28× 28 = 784 pixels.
In the following experiments, we evaluate the proposed
approaches under two types of adversarial samples. In order to
first demonstrate that our mechanisms do indeed preserve the
classification performance of the DNN, we test them with the
original test set. We then test our methods with cross model
adversarial samples to show that we achieve our secondary
design goal.
B. Limitations of Adversarial Training
Recently, adversarial training has been shown to be effec-
tive in decreasing the classification error rates at test time [10],
[24]. Adversarial training samples are generated using the
fast gradient sign method (Section II). At test time, new
‘adversarial test samples’ are generated based on unseen,
legitimate test samples, given that the original DNN model
is readily accessible. In this case, adversarial training results
in improved robustness.
We next build two different DNNs (model A and B) that
share the same purpose–image recognition. Furthermore, we
utilize adversarial training in learning both models A and B,
which we denote as models AADT and BADT . Note that all
following experiment results are the result of evaluating model
AADT using different testing samples. The results appear in
Table I. The second row ‘Legitimate’ presents the classification
error rates achieved by model AADT when testing with normal
samples. In the next third and fourth row, we show classifi-
cation error rates using adversarial samples generated from
model A and model B respectively. While the classification
error in both settings is lower than 30%, the error rate obtained
when testing with adversarial samples generated from model
A itself is higher than the error rate found when testing with
adversarial sample generated from a different model B. We
speculate that this is possible because adversarial samples
generated from a specific model might be more powerful
for attacking that specific model. According to these results,
adversarial training is indeed effective, depending on which
external normal DNN model is used as the adversary.
However, as previously mentioned in Section III, DNN
models learned using adversarial training are still vulnerable to
unseen adversarial samples crafted specifically to target them.
To demonstrate this limitation, we show the results of testing
model AADT with new adversarial test samples generated
from itself in the fifth row of Table I. The classification error
rate is 78.10%, which is considerably higher than 25.06%
when testing model AADT with adversarial testing samples
generated from model A. This result is consistent with our
previous analysis that the effectiveness of adversarial training
is limited. In addition, we also present several visual samples
of legitimate MNIST images as well as adversarial images
generated from both model A and AADT in Fig. 4. As shown
in Fig. 4, the legibility of image samples decreases as the attack
power of these samples is increased. This indicates that an
adversary would need to balance a trade-off between increasing
attack strength and maintaining recognizable.
In the last row of Table I, we further show that the classi-
fication error rate of 57.15% when testing model AADT with
adversarial samples generated from model BADT . Although
the error rate is lower than 78.10%, it is still considerably
Table I. CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE OF TESTING AN
ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ENHANCED MODEL WITH VARIOUS
ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES
Different testing sets Classification error ratesof model AADT
Legitimate 0.0213
Adversarial testing samples from A 0.2506
Adversarial testing samples from B 0.1633
Adversarial testing samples from AADT 0.7810
Adversarial testing samples from BADT 0.5715
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Figure 4. Examples of different legitimate adversarial samples from MNIST. The top row shows examples of legitimate images, in comparison with the middle
and bottom rows, in which adversarial samples generated from model A and AADT are shown, respectively. Clear distortion of images can be observed in
the bottom two rows. Moreover, the distortion is increased for adversarial samples generated from AADT . This implies that model AADT is more robust than
model A, which can be attributed to adversarial training. More specifically, an attack on model AADT requires yet further perturbation which makes it easier
for humans to identify the assault.
higher than both 16.33% and 25.06% shown in the third and
fourth rows. This result demonstrates that adversarial samples
generated from enhanced DNN models maintain their cross-
model efficacy. It is important to note that the effectiveness of
the attack varies across models, an effect observed when using
ordinary adversarial samples.
C. Classification Performance
1) Classification Performance of DLM-DNN: In this ex-
periment, we fix the reduced dimensionality to 100. These
mappings are found by DLM and PCA. In order to better
explore the effect of combining DLM with PCA, we vary
the percentage Ppca of PCA mappings used in the fixed 100
dimension. Meanwhile, the percentage of DLM mappings used
varies according to 100 − Ppca. In addition, we also change
the level of noise added to study its influence on classification
performance.
We first show the classification performance when testing
with legitimate samples in the column named as ‘Legitimate’
in Table II. The noise coefficient is set to be either 0.1 or
0.3, while Ppca varies from 5% to 95%. We first notice
that our proposed DLM-DNN does result in any significant
performance degradation compared to adversarial training,
especially when the noise coefficient is equal to 0.1. However,
it is noticeable that with a larger noise coefficient of 0.3, the
classification error rate of DLM-DNN goes up. This perfor-
mance degradation is due to the increase of noise injected
into the lower dimensional mappings. Therefore, we conclude
that if properly set, DLM-DNN can result in performance
comparable to adversarial training.
We further examine the influence of varying Ppca on
classification performance. As shown in Table II, the classi-
fication performance slightly improves in this case. This also
happens when the noise coefficient is set to 0.3. To better
explain the performance boost, we further show the variance
in preservation rates as a function of different dimensionalities
using PCA in Fig. 5. We show that PCA preserves over 90% of
the critical information within samples from the MNIST data
set when mapping original data to the 100 dimensional space.
However, according to Fig. 5, when Ppca = 5%, information
preserved by PCA is insufficient for representing the original
samples well. Meanwhile, the 95% mapping obtained from
DLM is not as effective as PCA mappings for representing
the original samples. Therefore, this combination leads to
the highest classification error rates for both noise coefficient
Table II. CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE OF DLM-DNN AND
DRLIM-DNN
Trained
Model
Classification error rates
with different testing sets
Legitimate Adversarial
Normal DNN 0.0198 0.8981
Adversarial Training Enhanced DNN 0.0213 0.2506
DLM-DNN
Noise
coefficient of 0.1
PCA(95%) 0.0226 0.3591
PCA(75%) 0.0247 0.3211
PCA(50%) 0.0258 0.2893
PCA(25%) 0.0268 0.2735
PCA(5%) 0.3101 0.5212
Noise
coefficient of 0.3
PCA(95%) 0.0386 0.2869
PCA(75%) 0.0403 0.2685
PCA(50%) 0.0427 0.2609
PCA(25%) 0.0452 0.2699
PCA(5%) 0.3710 0.5529
DrLIM-DNN 0.0384 0.1380
equal to 0.1 and 0.3. However, as Ppca reaches 25%, enough
information is preserved resulting in only a slight decrease in
classification error. Meanwhile, when Ppca varies from 25%
to 95%, the benefit of preserving any further information
diminishes as with only a negligible decrease in the error rate.
We next evaluate the classification performance of DLM-
DNN when confronted with adversarial samples. We list the
classification error rates in the column noted as ‘Adversarial’.
According to Table II, the error rates obtained by the DLM-
DNN are considerably lower than that of a standard DNN,
0.8981. Again, when Ppca is properly set, the DLM-DNN
achieves results comparable to adversarial training. The highest
error rate is obtained when Ppca = 5%, for either noise
coefficient is set to 0.1 or 0.3. This is consistent from our
previous analysis for testing with legitimate samples. Interest-
ing enough, as Ppca ranges from 25% to 95%, classification
error goes up. This observation might imply that the impact of
adversarial samples is mitigated to a larger degree when more
Figure 5. Variance preservation rates with different reduced dimensions of
PCA.
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(a) 2D mapping of legitimate samples (b) 2D mapping of adversarial samples
Figure 6. 2D mapping generated by DrLIM. In both (a) and (b), we show the 2D projection of 200 legitimate samples and 200 corresponding adversarial
samples. Among these samples, half are randomly selected from class 4 (red dots) while the other half is randomly selected from class 9 (red dots). In (a), we
highlight two outliers from both class 4 and 9 as well as their neighbours. Similarly, we highlight 8 outliers from both classes and mark each outlier sequentially
by assigning each with an index, ranging from 1 to 8.
random disturbances are added.
2) DrLIM-DNN Classification Performance: In this experi-
ment we demonstrate the classification performance of DrLIM-
DNN. The training set used for evaluation includes 5 classes
from the MNIST data, and each class contains 2000 samples.
For testing, each of the 5 classes contains 1000 testing samples.
The adversarial testing samples are generated based on this
testing set.
For training the DrLIM, we label a pair of image samples
as similar when they have the same label. This simplifies
the training of DrLIM utilizing strong prior knowledge. We
further set the reduced dimension to 30 during the experiments.
Classification performance is shown in the bottom part of
Table II. According to these results, using DrLIM-DNN results
in a slightly higher error rate (0.0384) when testing with
legitimate samples, but achieves a significant improvement in
performance (0.1380) when testing adversarial samples. Espe-
cially in the latter case, DrLIM-DNN shows higher robustness
when compared to adversarial training.
As previously introduced in Section V, DrLIM is designed
with the objective of preserving similarity between a pair of
high dimensional samples when mapped to lower dimensional
space. In order to better illustrate this property, we first
map 200 legitimate examples of MNIST image samples into
2D dimension using DrLIM. According to the visualization
of the 2D mapping shown in Fig. 6(a), DrLIM effectively
preserves the similarity of legitimate samples in the mapped
2D space. We notice some outliers and hence highlight them
and their neighbours by showing their corresponding images.
For example, in Fig. 6(a), one of the outliers is a blue dot
representing 9 surrounded by two red nots representing 4.
Meanwhile the other outlier is a red 4 neighbouring to two blue
9s. As shown in Fig. 6(a), these outliers are hard to recognize,
even for human.
Since the point of DrLIM is to preserve the similarity in a
lower dimensional space, we further visualize the 2D mapping
of 200 adversarial samples in Fig. 6(b). Note that these
adversarial samples are generated from those 200 legitimate
samples selected before. The 2D mapping in this case is not
as clear as that for legitimate samples, especially since the
overlapping is more obvious. However, the similarity between
pairs of samples are still reasonably well-preserved. In order
to explore more of these outliers, in Table III, we show the
probabilities of making wrong classification decisions when
testing a normal DNN and a DrLIM-DNN with these outliers.
As shown in Table III, these outliers cause a normal DNN to
make wrong classification results with over 97% confidence.
However, when processed with DrLIM-DNN, although these
outliers are not mapped to ideal regions, the probabilities of
being wrongly classified is significantly reduced to lower than
66%. This result indicates that a DrLIM-DNN is effective
for responding to unfamiliar samples with lower confidence.
Therefore, DrLIM-DNN will not suffer as much as a normal
DNN would when confronted with highly confusing adversar-
ial samples.
As our experimental results show, DrLIM-DNN provides
the best performance when tested against adversarial sam-
ples. In particular, the DrLIM-DNN achieves a classification
error rate 44.93% (smaller than the classification error rate
obtained using adversarial training). In addition, DrLIM-DNN
also shows its effectiveness for avoiding making strongly
confident predictions for adversarial samples. With respect to
this property, there has been limited research that shows similar
results. However, since the DrLIM requires also building a
CNN model, the computational cost is much higher compared
Table III. CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENCE OBTAINED FROM NORMAL
DNN AND DRLIM-DNN
Outlier No.
Classification confidence
of testing adversarial samples
Normal DNN DrLIM-DNN
1 0.9995 0.5196
2 0.9721 0.5290
3 0.9989 0.6220
4 0.9921 0.5646
5 0.9998 0.5903
6 0.9997 0.5402
7 0.9998 0.6596
8 0.9919 0.5638
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to both DLM-DNN and adversarial training. Therefore, to best
utilize the advantages of DrLIM-DNN, it might be reasonable
to use a smaller data set with a fewer number of classes.
D. Reconstruction Performance
As previously introduced in Section V, both DLM-DNN
and DrLIM-DNN are non-invertible for different reasons. More
importantly, we have proven that recovering the original data
from a low dimensional space induced by DrLIM is an
NP-hard problem. In this subsection, we mainly focus on
inverting the proposed dimensional reduction method DLM
by approximating it with a linear transformation matrix. We
obtain the linear transformation matrix by solving a linear
regression problem. In case the original data is sparse, we
further employ a linear regression with L1 regularization. First,
we demonstrate that when configuring DLM as pure PCA, the
approach is not robust given that it may be effectively inverted
and thus allow for reconstruction of adversarial samples. Next,
we examine the reconstruction error obtained from inverting
DLM, taking a percentage of PCA mappings less than 100%.
We evaluate the reconstruction performance when inverting
one extreme case of DLM, where DLM uses only PCA
mappings. In this way, the original samples are only processed
by PCA before being input to a DNN model. We refer to this
method as PCA-DNN for comparison. Therefore, an adversary
can easily recover the adversarial images given their lower
dimensional mappings. To examine this extreme case, we
first configure DLM as pure PCA and map legitimate testing
samples to a 100-dimensional space. Then we reconstruct these
legitimate samples by inverting PCA, as explained in Section
V. To demonstrate the effectiveness of inverting PCA, we show
reconstructed legitimate samples in Fig. 7(a). In this case,
the reconstruction was successful and the samples are haradly
different from legitimate ones. Now we assume that an adver-
sary has acquired the lower dimensional mappings generated
by PCA. According to Section II, this adversarial can easily
generate their corresponding lower dimensional adversarial
mappings. Following the inversion procedure of Section V, this
adversary can further reconstruct adversarial samples based
on these lower dimensional adversarial mappings. We also
show the reconstructed adversarial samples in Fig. 7(b). While
Table IV. CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE OF PCA-DNN AND
DLM-DNN TESTING WITH RECONSTRUCTED ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES BY
INVERTING PCA
Trained
models
Classification error rates of testing
with reconstructed adversarial samples
Normal DNN 0.6596
Noise
Coefficient of 0.1
PCA(95%) 0.2846
PCA(75%) 0.2011
PCA(50%) 0.1447
PCA(25%) 0.1131
PCA(5%) 0.3691
Noise
Coefficient of 0.3
PCA(95%) 0.1864
PCA(75%) 0.1729
PCA(50%) 0.1449
PCA(25%) 0.1884
PCA(5%) 0.4766
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Figure 8. Reconstruction errors with varying parameters for inverting DLM.
For each curve, it represents the reconstruction errors generated by setting
reduced dimensions in the range of (20, 100). Meanwhile, the percentage of
PCA mapping is fixed to any value of 5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95%.
Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) are difficult to differentiate, we use the
reconstructed adversarial samples to test a normal DNN model
and a DLM-DNN under different settings. According to the
testing results shown in Table IV, the reconstructed adversarial
samples maintain their attack power against a normal DNN
model. The classification error rate in this case is larger than
60%. In contrast, these adversarial samples can be effectively
defended by a DLM-DNN as shown in Table II.
We finally investigate the reconstruction errors when invert-
ing DLM-DNN. Note that since we have shown that using PCA
is not secure for defending against reconstructed adversarial
samples, the reconstruction errors for this extreme case will
not included in following discussion. We present reconstruc-
tion errors when varying percentages of PCA mappings used
and when varying sub-space dimensionality in Fig 8. Our
experiment shows that inverting a DLM-DNN leads to high
reconstruction errors, regardless of how many PCA mappings
are used what dimensionality is used. Recall the theoretical
analysis of DrLIM-DLM in Section V, we demonstrate that
our proposed methods effectively build an adversary-resistant
DNN.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this work, we build adversary-resilient DNN archi-
tectures using non-invertible dimension reduction methods.
Related research commonly falls into the area of adversarial
machine learning or dimensionality reduction methods. In
this section we introduce several state-of-the-art adversar-
ial machine learning technologies. These technologies can
be categorized as either data augmentation or DNN model-
complexity enhancement. Finally, we present several prevalent
dimensionality reduction methods and study their suitability
under our proposed framework.
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(a) Reconstructed legitimate samples (b) Reconstructed adversarial samples
Figure 7. Reconstructed samples by inverting PCA-DNN. The reconstructed legitimate and adversarial samples are shown in (a) and (b) respectively. Specifically,
the former are reconstructed based on the lower dimensional mappings of legitimate samples. As for the latter, reconstruction is conducted based on lower
dimensional adversarial mappings.
A. Adversarial Machine Learning
Approaches to the robustness issue mainly focus on adver-
sarial training and enhancing DNN complexity.2
Adversarial training approaches usually augment the train-
ing set by integrating adversarial samples [35]. More for-
mally, this data augmentation approach can be theoretically
interpreted regularizing the training objective function. This
regularization is designed to penalize certain gradients using
the derivative of the loss with respect to the input variables.
The penalized gradients indicate a direction in the input space
that the objective function is most sensitive to. For example,
recent work[10] introduced such an objective function, directly
combining a regularization term with the original cost function.
Instead of training a DNN with a mixture of adversarial and
legitimate samples, other approaches [23] use only adversarial
samples. Despite the difference between these strategies, a uni-
fying framework,DataGrad [24], was proposed to generalize
adversarial training of deep architectures and help explain prior
approaches [11], [29].
However, since adversarial training still falls into the cate-
gory of data augmentation, which, as explained earlier in this
paper, cannot possibly hope to cover the entire infinite space
of possible adversarial samples. In other words, adversarial
training is still vulnerable to unforeseen adversarial samples.
Therefore, we looked to improving the robustness of DNNs
by enhancing the model complexity.
Recent work [26], denoted as distillation enhances a normal
DNN by enabling it to utilize other informative inputs. More
specifically, for each input training sample, instead of using
its original hard label which only indicates whether it belongs
to a particular class, the enhanced DNN utilizes a soft label.
This means that probability distribution over all classes is
used as a corresponding target vector. In order to use this
more informative soft label, two DNNs must be designed
successively and then stacked together. One DNN is designed
for generating more informative input samples while the other
DNN is trained using these more informative samples in the
usual way. However, as discussed in section III, once the
architecture of distillation is disclosed to attackers, it is always
possible to find adversarial samples based on this very defense
mechanism. If an attacker [3] generates adversarial samples
by artificially reducing the magnitude of the input to the final
2For details of robustness issues, please see Section II.
softmax function and modifies the objective function used for
generating adversarial samples [25], the defensively distilled
networks are open to assault. A denoising autoencoder [11] ap-
proach was also proposed to filter out adversarial perturbations.
However, it too suffers from the same problem as [26]. Again,
once the architecture of the stacked DNN and auto-encoder is
disclosed, attackers can still generate adversarial samples by
treating this new model as a normal feed-forward DNN only
with more hidden layers. Indeed, adversarial samples of this
stacked DNN [11] show even smaller distortion compared with
adversarial samples generated from the original DNN. Thus,
a successful method for increasing model complexity requires
the property that even if the model architecture is disclosed, it
would not be possible to generate adversarial samples based
on this information.
B. Dimensionality Reduction Methods
From the previous analysis in Section IV, we see that
dimensionality reduction has definite advantages for the design
goals of our proposed architecture using non-invertible data
transformations. As such, we investigated various dimensional
reduction methods including both linear and nonlinear meth-
ods.
Recall from Section V, dimensionality reduction methods
that preserve the similarity between high dimensional samples
in the mapped lower dimensional space can be helpful in de-
fending against adversarial samples. This is due to the fact that
adversarial samples are highly similar to legitimate samples yet
can be wrongly classified in a lower dimensional space. One
popular linear dimension reduction method with aforemen-
tioned characteristic is multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) [17].
MDS is computationally efficient and has been widely adopted
in various machine learning tasks. More importantly, MDS
generates lower dimensional mappings based on similarity,
which is usually represented by Euclidean distance, between
high dimensional data points. Given this property, an adversar-
ial sample will not be mapped that far away from its similar,
legitimate neighbors. However, MDS have three shortcomings
which restrict its usage in our proposed framework. First, since
MDS is built only with distance information between samples,
critical feature information contained in data samples cannot be
preserved. Second, MDS cannot provide a mapping from high
dimensional input to a lower dimensional output when being
applied to unseen data samples. When stacking DNN on top of
MDS, whenever unseen samples appears, the entire combined
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architecture needs to be retrained, which is computationally
undesirable.
We also investigated another nonlinear dimensional reduc-
tion methods of t-SNE [19]. Specially, t-SNE is similar to
MDS in that it is also capable of preserving the similarity
between high dimensional data in a lower dimensional space.
t-SNE minimizes KL-divergence between two probability dis-
tributions, one representing the probability of being neighbors
in a high dimensional space while the other represents the
probability of being neighbors in a lower dimensional space.
However, similar to MDS, t-SNE is not suitable for online
processing.
The dimensionality reduction methods used in our pro-
posed framework take these aforementioned issues into ac-
count. In particular, DLM is more computationally efficient
in that it can easily preserve feature information of the
original data samples. Meanwhile, DrLIM not only preserves
similarity and important feature information of original input
space simultaneously, but is an incremental algorithm. More
importantly, both DLM and DrLIM are non-invertible which
we justify in theoretically and empirically in Sections V and
VI.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new framework for constructing deep neural
network models that are robust to adversarial samples. Our
framework design is based on an analysis of both the “blind-
spot” of DNNs and the limitations of currently proposed
solutions.
Using our proposed framework, we developed two
adversary-resilient DNN architectures that leverage non-
invertible data transformation mechanisms. Using the first
proposed approach for processing the data fed into DNN
models, we empirically showed that crafting an adversarial
sample for this architecture will incur significant distortion and
thus lead to easily detectable adversarial samples. In contrast,
under the second architecture, we theoretically demonstrated
that it is impossible for an adversary to craft an adversarial
sample to attack it. This implies that our proposed framework
no longer suffers from attacks that rely on generating model-
specific adversarial samples.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that recently studied adver-
sarial training methods are not sufficient defense mechanisms.
Applying our new framework to the MNIST data set, we
empirically demonstrate that our new framework significantly
reduces the error rates in classifying adversarial samples.
Furthermore, our new framework has the same classification
performance for legitimate samples with negligible degrada-
tion. Future work will entail investigating the performance of
our framework in a wider variety of applications.
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